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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
State of Ohio, 
Plaintiff-Ap~llee, 
-vs- No. 34,615 
Sam H. Sheppard, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
ON THE MERITS 
The prosecution has not returned the record of 
testimony to the Clerk of this Court, however, notes already 
taken of the record will suffice for this reply to the 
State's briefs on the merits. 
The State endeavors to distinguish between com-
munications made to the jury during its actual deliberation 
and those made to the jury between deliberation session but 
while under supervision of the Officer placed in charge 
until a verdict is returned. 
The statute makes no such distinction. For 
instance, Section 2945.33 provides in part as follows: 
"When a cause is finally submitted ·'~ ~ · ,, The 
court may permit the jurors to separate during 
the adjournment of court overnight, under 
proper cautions, or under supervision of an 
officer. Such officer shall not permit a 
communication to be made to them, ::- -:;. -;:-
unless he does so by order of the court. * -; ~ ~ ~ " 
(Underscoring ours) 
1 The oath provided for such an officer in charge 
2 of a jury after the case is submitted to them is set out 
3 in Section 2945.32, a'1 in part is as follows: 
" 
11 
':· ~' -:~'You do solemnly swear '1'' •1' _,, that you 
will not suffer any communications to be 
5 made to them, or any of them, orally or 
otherwis-e; :;. i '· ~~ except by the order of 
5 this court, :; ·:0 ' :· '" 
7 These mandatory provisions controlling the jury 
B and the conduct of the officers in charge take effect im-
9 mediately when the case is submitted to the jury. Such 
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provisions are in full force, effect and controlling until 
the jury returns its verdict or is discharged by the court. 
State v. Adams, 141 Ohio St., 423, at page 430, 
comments upon this situation in this language: 
"The fact that in this case the communica-
tion took place in the jury room rather 
than outside as in the case of Emmert v. 
State, supra, in the opinion of the court, 
presents a distinction without a substantial 
difference in legal effect or practical 
results ·1~ ·::. -~ II 
• 
Under this ground of error misconduct of jurors 
and the officials in charge of it -- it is established without 
any contradiction that the members of the jury themselves 
violated the orders of the court. The officials in charge 
of the jury permitted members of the jury time after time 
to call over the telephone whomsoever they desired, make 
their own connections, and converse with the other parties 
l without the official in charge knowing what was said to the 
2 juror. When defense endeavored to question the official 
3 about what he may have learned, prosecution objected and 
the court sustained t r#= objection. 
5 This was a flagrant violation of the provisions of 
5 two sections of the statutes expressly enacted to prevent 
7 exactly what occurred here, without let or hindrance. The 
B court was ignored by the officials. These violations of the 
9 law by the officials in charge of the jury were committed 
10 without once seeking the advice and order of the court even 
11 though the officials had been expressly admonished by the 
12 court and took an oath that there would be no communica-
13 tions made to the jury without the knowledge and consent and 
llJ 
supervision of the court. Either these statutes mean what 
15 they plainly say, and should be enforced or else they are 
18 
to be ignored, made nugatory, and vain. The errors com-
17 
mitted under this assignment of error were prejudicial as 
18 
has been held by this court in the Adams case and by courts 
19 
of last resort throughout the country. The rule established 
20 
and Tallowed in Federal Courts is even more strict than that 
21 
in the State Courts. A violation of the statutes here must 
22 
be presumed to be prejudicial. If lower courts and 
23 
officials charged with a sacred duty are permitted to 
21J 
violate statutes as in this instance, then the jury system 
l is shorn or its sacredness and its integrity. When such 
2 flagrant violations of law occur then this Court should 
3 reverse. It is only by a reversal that our trial courts 
~ will have impressed upon them their duty to see to it that 
5 officials instructed and appointed by them perform their 
B proper duty as required by law~ This is a denial of due 
7 process of law. It should be observed that this was an 
8 extremely doubtful case. The jury was out five days and 
nights. The case was blazed across the headlines every 
10 day for months. Poisonous, vicious and false broadcasts , 
11 ~ filled the air and were h~d by jurors. It was the topic 
12 
of conversation at every place where more than one person 
13 
assembled. There can be no doubt that the persons talking 
l~ 
to the jurors mentioned the case. Upsetting conditions 
15 
at home may have well been brought to the attention of 
18 
the jurors which affected their attitude of mind. 
17 
We cannot emphasize or urge too strongly the 
18 
pr~judicial error committed in the charge of the court to 
19 
the jury. We will again emphasize here the prejudicial 
nature of the courts charge upon the reputation of the 
21 
defendant as to his general conduct and his propensities 
22 
toward. peaceful and quiet living. The charge on that point 
23 
is found at pages 7006, 7007 of the record. - The prejudice 
is created in this language of the court in its ·charge 
------------1t"'-------------------~~~~~~~--~ 
l as f ollows: 
2 11 Some ev i dence has been given in this case 
concerning the claimed general conduct and 
3 reputation of the defendant and it is proper 
to present such evidence for your considera-
/J tior. . It i s not admitted because it furnishe s 
proof of guilt or innocence, but because it i s 
5 a ma tter of common knowledge that people of 
good charac t er and reputation do not generally 
5 commit serious or major crimes.·~ ;" 4; 11 
7 By t his l anguage t he court emphatically charged 
8 the jury that reputa t ion or general conduct was not to be 
9 considered or used in arriving at guilt or innocence. Such 
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language is in direct violation of every decision on the 
~ 
subject. It is contrary to the statutes of Ohio made and 
enacted for the control of trials. Section 2945.04, 
Revised Code of Ohio, i n the definition of reasonable doubt 
states the following: 
It is that state of the case 
which, after the entire comparison and consid-
eration of all the evidence, 'I'- " ' .;~ ' ~~ ·);- ~;. 11 
The statute in unmistakable language requires that 
the jury give full and fair consideration to all the evi-
dence. By the charge of the court in this cause the jury 
· was not permitted to consider all of the evidence in arriv-
al 
u 1ng at its verdict. Again, the defendant has been denied 
process or law. Here, sticking out like a sore thumb, 
~ot &dmoni.tion by the court to the Jury that it 
1i•;;,1~.4~m·.: ., 
as to general conduct in 
' 
l arriving at its verdict of guilt or innocence. 
2 In its brief on the merits the State again refers 
a to the T shirt. The emphasis given the jury about the T 
JJ shirt by the State made it one of the outstanding features 
5 of the evidence. The State has taken three distinct and 
B separate positions on the matter of the T shirt. In the 
'1 trial the State claimed that the T shirt was covered with 
~ 
B blood and that therefore the defendant got rid of it some 
B way. That was its position before the Court of Appeals. 
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In the Appellant's brief on the motion for leave to appeal 
it was pointed out that such a spray of blood going downward, 
outward and upward would most assuredly have gotten on the 
upper part of the trousers of the defendant, if he were the 
killer, but there was not one vestige of blood on the upper 
part of the trousers or belt of the defendant. In its 
answer brief on the motion the State made its first shift 
in its theory about the T shirt. At page 86 of its brief 
on the motion the State said: 
"It may well be that defendant's T shirt 
sufficiently covered the upper part of 
his trousers." 
During the oral argument on the motion for leave 
to appeal it was demonstrated that blood on the thin cotton 
porous material of a T shirt would immediately penetrate 
through and get on the trousers. When queried by the Court 
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on this point the Prosecution had no explanation then to 
make. In the trial court the State agreed that the defend-
ant was wearing trousers. It so agreed in its brief on the 
motion for leave to appeal. Now more than a year after the 
trial the State in its answer brief on the merits concludes 
that the defendant did not have any trousers on. Just where 
does the requirement of proof that the circumstances must 
.. point unerringly to guilt and exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence apply? 
Let us discuss the last theory -- the no trousers 
on -- theory now advanced by the State. The evidence 
established that on the second floor and east of the bed-
room of Mr. and Mrs. Sheppard was Dr. Sheppard's dressing 
room. There was a light in this room all night. When 
retiring it was the custom of defendant to go to this 
dressing room, remove his clothes and attire himself in 
night apparel and then go to the bedroom. Under the most 
recent theory of the State it is now claimed -- or ml,.lBt be 
claimed -- that the defendant went to his dressing room, 
removed his trousers, his shorts, his socks, and his shoes, 
because no blood was found on any of these articles except-
ing a spot of blood on one knee of the trousers. He did not 
remove his T shirt according to the State and thus clad with 
an armless T shirt .and nothing else on, he went in and 
i killed his wife. Such lack of attire would expose his bare 
2 arms and his bare limbs. The thin cotton T shirt would be 
3 little protection to a woman 1 s fingernails. There was a 
~ violent struggle. That is agreed by both parties. At 
5 page 70 of the State 1 s brief contra motion for leave to 
6 appeal is this language referring to the victim: 
7 "One fingernail from the left hand of 
Marilyn Sheppard was practically torn off and 
B this may well have resulted from such a 
struggle." 
9 
The evidence also discloses that her fingernails 
lO ... 
were packed and embedded with foreign material. She 
ll 
scratched her assailant most vigorously. She was fighting 
12 
for her life and it is readily understood that a woman would 
13 
scratch and scratch with all of the strength that she had. 
Mrs. Sheppard was an athletic young woman, vigorous and 
strong. Yet in all of this struggle, according to the 
17 
testimony of Officers Schottke and Gareau who examined the 
18 defendant at the hospital on the morning of July 4th, there 
19 was not a single scratch on his arms or his limbs. There 
ro was no mark made by fingernails on him. He had a bruise 
21 over one eye obviously administered by a heavy object and 
22 another severe bruise at the top of the cervical spine. 
23 There was no scratch. What is a reasonable inference? Had 
the defendant committed this crime attired as the State now 
says he was, there would have been many scratches and marks 
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on his arms and limbs and probably his body. 
There were found two pieces of leather described 
in the evidence of different sizes that obviously came from 
a leather jacket. These were scratched out by the victim. 
Dr. Sheppard did not have a leatherette jacket or any other 
leather about the house that matched these two pieces found 
under the bed. One such piece was found on July 5th, the 
other piece somewhat later. A proper and logical inference 
may be drawn that if a man practically naked committed this 
horrible crime there would have been some scratches about 
his body, arms or legs as a result of this violent death 
struggle. 
Two pieces of tooth were found on the victim's 
bed when her body was removed. Dr. Gerber, the Coroner, 
rinally determined that these pieces or tooth were 
Marilyn's. The State's testimony establishes that the 
teeth were not broken off by any external blow to the face, 
otherwise the teeth would have fallen down into her throat. 
At page 1806 of the record the State pathologist testified: 
"Q. And the way that these teeth were broken 
off and the wound inside the mouth 
without any external wounds, indicated 
that something had got into the mouth; 
hadn't it? 
"A. Certainly." 
1 From the facts in the record a reasonable inference 
2 may be drawn. The assailant was delivering repeated blows 
3 about the head of the victim. She was struggling violently 
~ to resist the attack. She screamed. The assailant placed 
5 his hand over her mouth and a finger penetrated into the 
5 mouth and between the teeth. The victim clamped down on 
'1 this finger and it was jerked out violently, thereby 
B precipitating the broken teeth outwards and onto the bed 
9 where they were found. The assailant's finger would surely 
10 
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have been severely lacerated and caused much blood to 
emerge. There was not a scratch on the defendant's hands 
or fingers. The blood on the defendant's wristwatch later 
found in the green bag, and the blood on the victim's 
wristwatch over the face and links, was not the blood of 
Marilyn Sheppard according to the State's pathologist. She 
did not find any of the O group -- which was Marilyn's 
smeared over either the wristwatch of the victim or the 
wristwatch of the defendant. It is reasonable. to infer that 
~ 
the assailant's finger having been severely lacerated, his 
blood would have been smeared over both wristwatches. The 
blood was not that of the defendant. That the defendant's 
wristwatch was violently jerked off his wrist is indicated 
by physical damage to one of the links in the bracelet of 
the watch. A man removing his own wristwatch does not jerk 
1 it off with such violence. The State complains that the 
2 defendant does not explain this or that. It isn't the 
a obligation of the defendant to make any explanation at all. 
1J It is the duty of the State to present evidence sufficient 
5 to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the defendant 
5 offered himself time after time freely and voluntarily to 
7 the most severe interrogation. He was interrogated in the 
8 
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hospital on the morning of July 4th and for days thereafter. 
The Coroner arranged a Roman Holiday in a gymnasium or 
auditorium of the high school and announced that the 
defendant would be called upon to testify. We have never 
heard of an inquest so advertised as this. At any rate, 
probably a thousand or more people gathered and there f or 
five hours the defendant sat on the witness stand and every 
intimate act of his whole life was pryed into. The question-
ing was not confined to the cause of the death of Marilyn 
Sheppard as was the duty of the Coroner to ascertain, but 
open to every conceivable inquiry into his whole life. He 
submitted to that. All day and into the evening while in 
the County Jail he ~ubmitted to interrogation by police 
officers. 
It should be noted that a person entering from the 
street side of the house would pass through the kitchen to 
the stairway leading upstairs. Such a person would not see 
l the defendant lying on a cou~h against the wall along the 
2 stairway in the living room. 
3 At page 108 of the State's brief on the merits, 
lJ an error of the trial court is pointed out in this language: 
5 "In 39 American Jurisprudence, page 101, 
Section 86 , it is stated: 
7 
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11 r ~e ,):. * if it does not appear that the 
jurors have read the newspaper, a verdict 
will not be set aside merely because articles 
were published during the trial which were 
likely to influence the jury.' 
11 Annotated under this statement is the 
case of Fields v. Dewitt, 71 Kansas 676, 81 
P. 467, 6 Anno Caso 349, in which it was 
held that where articles discussing the 
merits of a case are shown to have been 
published during the trial in newspapers 
of general circulation in the community, 
it cannot be presumed upon review, against 
the finding of the trial court, that they 
were read by the jury, if there is no 
direct evidence to that ei'f'ecto 11 
It is of record that two members of the jury 
listened to and heard the vicious, false broadcast of Walter 
Winchell saying that the defendant, Sheppard, had had a 
mistress in New York who bore him a son who later died; that 
the woman was arrested for complicity in robbery. There it 
is established as a matter of record that the jurors or 
some of them, rather, did listen to vicious, false broad-
casts about the merits of the cas~. The court later refused 
to ask the jury if it had listened to further vicious broad-
casts comparing the defendant to Alger Hiss. The last 
1 phrase of the -quotation from the State's brief is "if· there 
2 is no direct · evidence to that effect." There . is direct evi-
3 dence in this record that members of the jury did listen to 
~ a vicious and false broadcast heaping calumny upon the 
5 defendant. 
5 This is a doubtful case. The three shifts of the 
7 State relative to the T shirt shows that even the prosecu-
B tion does not know what ground it will take or what premise 
9 it will assume in that vital feature of the evidence. The 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1~ 
1~ 
17 
two teeth jerked out of the victim's mouth with no lacera-
tion on the fingers of the defendant again casts doubt upon 
the verdict. The frantic search to match the leather found 
under the bed -- the bits of leather -- and the failure of 
the prosecution to find any leather that would match these 
two bits of leather cast further doubt upon the case. The 
finding of the green bag long after an intense search had 
been instituted and found in the position where the brush 
18 
had been cut down and beaten down under where the bag was 
19 
found would indicate that it was not tossed into the brush 
20 
during the night, but was placed there after the brush had 
21 
been beaten down and cut away. The blood on the defendant's 
22 
wristwatch was not the blood of the victim, nor his. Whose 
23 
was it? It was the blood of the assailant who jerked the 
wristwatch off of the defendant's wrist to cover up the 
25 
' ' 
- - ·-- -
l crime of the real assailant. The grievous injuries of t he 
2 defendant which could not have been simulated nor self-
3 inflicted cast f urther doubt upon the case. The State' s 
JJ theory, the State's claim that certain blood was on the 
5 stairway failed because blood probably was dropped there 
B during the years of the occupation of the house by the 
11 
12 
13 
Sheppards and their predecessors. At any rate, the blood 
obviously was not fresh because there was no blood whatso-
ever upon the shoes of the def endant. Blood does not wash 
off. 
In spite of t he broadcast heard by certain members 
of the jury, t he violent ly hostile press, and the general 
confusion attendant upon t he trial by photographers, the 
l/J jury was out five days and also some night sessions~ It 
16 
l~ 
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did not return a verdict of first degree murder, but did 
return a verdict of second degree, which means life. There 
was doubt throughout the whole case, it is saturated with 
doubt. Therefore, it appears that this Court' should then 
~rutinize very carefully the many, many errors pointed out 
in the briefs filed in this Court. There were wholesale 
unsupervised telephone communications between members of 
the jury and outsiders. The calls were put through by the 
jurors. The doctrine of the Adams case, supra, is that 
such communications being in direct violation of the 
l 
2 
3 
8 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ll 
12 
13 
15 
lB 
17 
statutes of Ohio creates a presumption of prejudice toward 
the defendant. The State made no effort whatsoever to remove 
this presumption but on the other hand by objections which 
were sustained thwarted the efforts of defendant's counsel 
to find out what, if anything, the jurors may have reported 
to the bailiff in charge relative to what may have been said 
to them over the telephone. The George Washington phase of 
the court's charge that because Washington happened to be 
on the driveway with an axe on his shoulder, he probably 
cut the cherry tree down is a deadly comparison with the 
case that Sheppard being in the home he therefore killed 
his wife. 
This being an extremely doubtful case, the court's 
charge on the general reputation for conduct of the defend-
ant as to peace and quiet was highly prejudicial. The jury 
was not allowed to consider that evidence in arriving at 
a verdict of guilty or innocent. The defendant was 
18 
deprived of his constitutional rights. He was denied due 
19 
process of law. The evidence of the State and of the 
20 
entire record not being legally sufficient to support a 
21 
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant 
22 
should have judgment entered for him and he should be 
23 
forthwith discharged. 
25 
l 
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If the court should not agree with that conclus ion 
then certainly there is prejudicial error requiring reversal 
of the verdict and a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL M. HERBERT 
GORDON K. BOLON 
JOSEPH So DEUTSCHLE, JR. 
WILLIAM J. CORRIGAN 
FRED W. GARMONE 
ARTHUR PETERSILGE 
Attorney.:ifor Defendant-Appellant 
11 Three (3) copies of this brief 
mailed to the 
12 
13 
Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio, this 12th day of April, 1956 0 
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lB Paul M. Herbert, Of Counsel 
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